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On March 26, 1964, the Honorable Paul T. Hellyer, Canada's Minis-
ter of National DeCence, tabled his White Paper on Defence' before Parlia-
ment and announced his intention to integrate the Armed Forces of Canada
under a single Chief of Defence Staff. Concurrent with this announcement,
the Minister mentioned a new programing system for the integrated Armed
Forces. To achieve this objective, it is intended to group the total Canadian
military structure into a number of major military missions for the Durpose
of establishing an integrated system of planning, programing, and budgeting.
Preliminary studies on a Canadian Defence programing system com-
menced during the early part of 1963. Although considerable progress has
been made to date, the proposed programing system remains in the develop-
ment stage and has not yet received official sanction.
During my assignment with the United States Navy Graduate Financial
Management Program, I became interested in the integrated system of plan-
ning, programing, and budgeting implemented by Secretary of Defense Robert
S. McNamara. It was during this tour of duty that I first became av/are of
this programing concept and its potential value as an aid to financial manage-
ment.
In Canada, the word equivalent to the American defense is spelled
'defence. :: In this paper, whenever reference is made to the Canadian mili-
tary organization, the word defence " is used.
ii

It is in the light of these developments that this paper has been pre-
pared. The tonic was not selected on the basis of any nrevious knowledge in
this field, but rather because of the lack of it. The paper reviews, in gen-
eral term*., the United States budget process, the programing system imple-
mented in the United States Department of Defense, and the proposals for
implementing a similar system in the Canadian Armed Forces.
bjectives of the Thes is
The primary objective is to examine the United States military
budget process with particular emphasis on the development of methods
oloyed for integrating planning, programing, and budgeting. It is honed
that the thesis may be of some value to other students wishing to obtain a
broad picture of this important and exciting subject.
A second objective is to transpose the system into a Canadian setting
and describe the work that has been accomplished toward laying the founda-
tion for implementing a programing system.
Methodology
The primary information was obtained through library research.
The historical background of the United States budgetary process and the
development of the military performance budget was compiled from past
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE BUDGET
What Is Budgeting
What is budgeting ' There are probably as many definitions of the
word 'budgeting" as there are people interested in or actively engaged in the
field of financial management.
Although the word "budget was originally used to designate the pub-
lic purse or bag which served as a receptacle for government revenues and
expenditures, the term budget has progressively increased in significance
with the passing years.
For those in business a budget signifies a plan of operation exoressed
in monetary terms. An accountant's dictionary defines the word budget as:
1. A financial plan serving as an estimate of and control
over future operations.
2. Hence, any estimate of future costs.
3. Any systematic plan for the utilization of manpower,
material, or other resources.
For those in government the term refers to the President's proposed
plan of action submitted to Congress for approval. Burkhead describes
*Eric L. Kohler, A Dictionary for Accountants (2d ed. rev. ;
Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice -Hall, Inc., 1957), p. 75.
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For those in government the term refers to the President's proposed
plan of action submitted to Congress for approval. Burkhead describes gov-
ernment budgeting as a cycle comprising four phases: "(1) executive prepara-
tion and submission, (2) legislative authorization, (3) execution, and (4)
audit. "
From the economist's point of view, budgeting is essentially an
economic problem involving, as it does, the allocation of scarce resources
2
among almost insatiable and competing demands. '
The budget process is generally recognized as one of the most power-
ful and useful management tools available to the President. As expressed in
the 1961 Annual Report of the Joint Financial Management Improvement Pro-
gram:
The budget process is generally recognized as one of the most im-
portant devices for establishing policies and for planning, coordinating,
and controlling programs as well as their financing. Through that
process the President formulates and presents his program and finan-
cial plan for consideration by Congress. After congressional action,
the Budget serves as a device for financial control and performance
evaluation in program execution. Improvement of the budget process,
therefore, is a matter of continuing concern throughout the Government. •*
Jesse Burkhead, Government Budgeting (New York: John Wiley &
Sons, Inc. , 1956), p. 87.
2
Arthur Smithies, The Budgetary Process in the United States (New
York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1955), op. xiv-xv.
3The Joint Financial Management Improvement Program, Annual
Report for Fisc al Year 1961 , December 12, 1961, p. 3.

The Treasury Act, 1789
The matter of continuing concern for improvement of the budget proc-
ess can readily be seen in the development of budgeting in the United States
Government. .The budget process as it exists today is the result of a long
and laborious evolution. The first reference to legislative authority and con-
trol of government revenues and expenditures is contained in the Constitution
of the United States, 1789. Article 1, section 8, subsection 1, states:
The Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes, duties,
imposts, and excises to t>ay the debts and provide for the common de-
fense and general welfare of the United States; but ail duties, imposts,
and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States. *
Subsections 2 and 5 authorize the government to borrow money on the credit
of the United States and to coin money. While these provide regulations for
the purpose of obtaining revenue, Section 9, subsection 7, provides that no
money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of appropriations
made by law; and regular statement and account of the receipts and expendi-
tures of all public money shall be published from time to time. '
The Treasury Act of 1789 followed immediately and assigned the
accounting responsibilities of the government to the Secretary of the Treas-
ury. The Act provided for a Comptroller, an Auditor, a Register of the
Treasury, and Treasurer. During the formative years of the budget process,
a power struggle evolved between the executive and legislative branches of
"Constitution of the United States, Universal Standard Encyclopedia
,





government. Congress emerged as victor in exercising control over execu-
tive departments but at the expense of centralized executive authority in
budgetary matters. The congressional system which developed between
1801 and 1909 resulted in what Burkhead classifies as the neriod of budgetary
disorganization in the Federal Government. '
Under this system executive departments dealt directly with congres-
sional committees. The President had no direct budgetary responsibilities
and Treasury's function merely consisted of transmitting the Departmental
Book of Estimates to Congress.
Although reforms were enacted during this period, they were of minor
significance. The United States was experiencing an affluent development
stage and was exempt from suffering fiduciary growing pains. Present-day
economic concepts appeared almost in reverse. Plagued by large suroluses
rather than deficits, Government was faced with large revenues and few
expenditures.
The Budget and Accounting Act, 1921
After the Civil War the general public had anticipated that government
expenditures would return to pre-war levels. When the upward trend was
not reversed, interest in government financial management increased im-
mensely. Because of a tremendous expansion in both government and private




a level as to arouse interest in the financial activities of the government.
In 1911 President William Howard Taft appointed a Commission on
Economy and Efficiency on the Subject of the Need for a National Budget.
The object of the Commission was to suggest a method of budgeting whereby
the President of the United States, as head of the administration would be
made responsible for presenting to Congress a definite business and financial
program. The Commission was also directed to produce a budget system
that would classify expenditures, appropriations, and estimates in such a
manner as to provide meaningful information for Congress as well as for the
benefit of interested citizens.
The Commission was in fact charged with the task of establishing
some means of improving cooperation between the President and Congress.
It was intended that the President should present clearly defined administra-
tive programs to Congress and the general public. Congress, on the other
hand, should have the responsibility of providing the President with definite
enactment authorizing him to execute his programs.
The above study ultimately resulted in one of the most significant
advances in government financial management being enacted as the Budget
and Accounting Act of 1921. The most important contribution of the Budget
and Accounting Act is that it olaced responsibility for the formulation and
submission of a National Budget squarely on the shoulders of the President,
who, as Head of the Executive Branch, was made fully responsible for the
administration of government activities.

The Act, in part, made provision for a National Budget system,
established the Bureau of the Budget under the administration of a Director
responsible to the President, and created the General Accounting Office
under a Comptroller General responsible only to Congress.
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 is considered a landmark in
the United States budgetary system. For the first time in history the system
made provision for executive formulation and presentation of programs,
authorization by Congress, execution under control of the President, and an
independent audit of executive activities for review by the legislative branch.
Government Reorganization
During the years following the enactment of the Budget and Accounting
Act of 1921, the budget system continued to be the subject of criticism and
continuous studies. Various amendments were enacted in order to improve
the budgetary process and orovide the President with a better tool for
responsible administrative management.
Generally speaking, further development in the budgetary process
provided for increased presidential power in the formulation and execution
of the government's financial activities. Authority to apportion funds was
transferred to the Bureau of the Budget from the heads of departments. This
procedure enabled the President to regulate the rate of expenditures and also
gave him authority to create reserves against appropriations in order to
provide for contingencies or effect savings through increased efficiency or
changes in requirements.

Following enactment of the Reorganization Act of 1939, Executive
Order No. 8248 transferred the Bureau of the Budget from the Treasury
Department to the newly established Executive Office o; the President. This
change is considered another landmark as it outlines the functions and duties
of the Bureau of the Budget, giving further emphasis to the fact that the
Bureau must concern itself with the over-all government financial manage-
ment. The changes implied an acknowledgment by Congress of the Presi-
dent's direct responsibility for the management of the government's execu-
tive branch. 'With increased responsibilities, it /the Bureau of the Budget/
emerged as the principal institution staff arm of the Chief Executive. '
The Budget and Accounting Procedures Act, 1950
The President's authority and responsibility with regard to the formu-
lation of the National Budget was further fortified with the enactment of the
Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950.
This Act incorporated the basic recommendation of the first Hoover
Commission. It provided for full disclosure of federal financial operations,
improvement of the budget and accounting systems, and an effective audit
program to control income and expenditures. This Act is considered by
many as the largest step forward since the Act of 1921. The Act also rede-
fined appropriations and specified that the President transmit the budget to
Congress during the first fifteen days of each regular session. Responsibility
U.S.
, Bureau of the Budget, Executive Office of the President,
The Bureau of the Budget : What It I s : What It Does (June, 1964), p. 2.

8for the preparation of the departmental estimates was placed on the head of
the agencies. The President, however, was given authority to determine
and specify the date for submission of departmental requests.
The budget process as it exists today is the result of a lengthy and
laborious development. The duties and responsibilities of both the executive
and legislative branches of government have been clearly defined. Responsi-
bility for the formulation and preparation of the National Budget has been
duly fixed in the Head of the Executive Branch, the President of the United
States. The Legislative Branch, deriving its powers from the Constitution,
authorizes the President's plans through the legislative and appropriations
processes.
Within this political framework, a detailed and exacting budget pro-
cedure has been established providing a complete cycle of budget prepara-
tion, authorization, execution, and control through audit procedures. The
following chapter gives a brief description of the budget cycle and the roles





Budgeting is a never-ending job and often appears to be confusing as
the phases of one budget overlap the phases of others. For example,
between January and June of each year, personnel involved in budgeting are
often required to deal with three budgets simultaneously. While executing
the budget for the current fiscal year, the budget for the fiscal year com-
mencing in July is being presented and justified before Congress, and the
budget for the fiscal year to commence one year from July 1 is being planned
and developed. Consequently, it is helpful to single out one budget and fol-
low it through the entire cycle.
The budget cycle can be divided into four distinct phases: prepara-
tion, authorization, execution, and audit. Timing is important in budgeting
and considerable effort is exerted at all levels to meet the various deadlines
which have been established. While the budget cycle is long, consuming
some thirty-one months, "it is a period filled with intense activity, short
deadlines, and continual discussion, analysis, justification, and revision. "
A graphical representation of a typical budget cycle is given in
Figure 1, page 10.
U. S.
, Department of the Navy, Office of the Comptroller, The
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A typical budget formulation begins with program planning started
many months before the beginning of the fiscal year for which the budget is
being prepared. During this initial stage, units and bureaus commence
planning for the fiscal budget beginning one year from the following July 1.
For example, in December 1964 agencies would have begun preparation of
the budget for the fiscal year commencing July 1, 1966, and terminating on
June 30, 1967.
Very early in this stage the departmental budget offices issue the
"budget call outlining departmental policy decisions and transmitting tech-
nical information necessary for the preparation of estimates.
During the month of May, Cabinet officers and heads of independent
agencies discuss their probable requirements with the Bureau of the Budget.
At this point, the Bureau of the Budget prepares estimates of the total gov-
ernment expenditures in anticipation of meetings with the President for the
purpose of developing an over -all program and budget policy. During these
presidential meetings, expenditure estimates are discussed in the light of
programs, revenue estimates, and general economic trends upon which
policy decisions are made.
Following these departmental and presidential discussions, the
Bureau of the Budget issues a policy letter to the heads of departments and
agencies setting forth, in general terms, the economic assumptions upon
which the budget is to be prepared. Presidential decisions affecting the
•
12
various areas of government activities are transmitted as well as the budget
ceilings for most departments and agencies.
In June the Bureau of the Budget issues the Calls for Estimates, "
requesting that budgets be prepared on the basis of approved programs.
Such matters as budget format, timing, and the nature of budget justifications
are set forth in this letter.
During July and August the departments and agencies, assisted when
required by the Bureau of the Budget, prepare their budget and detailed jus-
tification. Submission of the budget estimates and justification normally
occurs on the first of September.
During the months of September, October, and November, the Bureau
of the Budget's examiners conduct hearings on departmental budgets. The
recommendations of budget examiners are reviewed by the Director, and
provision is made for appeals by departments and agencies. During this
last stage, appeals are dealt with by the Director or the President as aopli-
cable, and once finalized, the President's budget is prepared and printed.
Authorization Phase /
In mid-January, the President's proposed programs and recommen-
dations for the following year are submitted to Congress. Shortly after the
President's proposals have been heard, the appropriations committees
undertake congressional review of the budget. It is traditional for the House
of Representatives to initiate appropriations. The House Committee on

13
Appropriations is made up of fifty members. The committee chairman
forms thirteen subcommittees of from six to fourteen members each. Each
subcommittee chairman is responsible for scheduling hearings, analyzing
budget requests of one or more designated agencies, and developing proposed
bills for presentation to the House by the full committee.
The departments and agencies appear before the subcommittees and
present their budgets and justification thereof. After the hearings, the sub-
committees determine the appropriations to be recommended and any limi-
tations they wish to attach to the utilization of funds. The subcommittee's
report, together with the appropriation bill, are then referred to the House
Appropriations Committee. The latter presents the bill to the House of
Representatives, which is resolved into the Committee of the Whole. The
bills are debated, voted upon by the House, and passed on to the Senate.
In the Senate the budget is again subjected to review. Designated
subcommittees deal with specific areas of the budget and procedures are
very similar to those followed by the House subcommittees. During both
House and Senate hearings, an opportunity is provided for individual depart-
ments and agencies to present whatever information they believe might help
their justifications and assist the subcommittees in their deliberations.
The proposed bill is prepared by the subcommittee, passed to the full
committee, and then forwarded to the Senate. After various amendments




Usually the bill passed by the Senate will differ from the one passed
by the House. Conferees are appointed to the Conference Committee and,
once reconciliation is agreed, upon, the bill is forwarded to the House, the
Senate, then onward to the President for signature, and then becomes law.
Traditionally the Senate is the more lenient of the two legislative
bodies. The Senate tends to act as a court of appeal, and Senate hearings
are normally directed at the differences between the appropriations as
requested and the reductions imposed by the House. Senator Paul Douglas
puts it this way:
Another interesting phase of the congressional appropriations
orocess is the way the Senate seems invariably to increase appro-
priations over the amounts passed by the House. One of the com-
mon jokes around Washington is that an agency will request more
than it actually needs, depending on the House to cut its request by
50 per cent, the Senate to restore the amount to 100 per cent, and
the conference committee to compromise at 75 per cent, which is
the figure actually wanted by the agency in the first place. *
Figure 2 illustrates the authorization of the budget by Congress.
Execution Phase
The execution phase begins on the first of July of each year after
enactment of appropriations. With few exceptions, appropriations are
made directly to the departments and agencies rather than to the President.
Within fifteen days after approval, agencies and departments initiate action
to obtain release of authorization from the Bureau of the Budget. Requests
Paul H. Douglas, Economy in the National Government (Chicago:




2. --Legislative Authorization of the Budget
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for apportionment outline the need for the funds and state the amount
required.
Agencies and departments render monthly reports to the Treasury
and the Bureau of the Budget. These reports list the current status of
authorizations, apportionments to date, obligations, and expenditures.
These form the basis upon which re -examination of apportionment is carried
out by the Bureau of the Budget. The apportionment process gives the Presi-
dent the power to create reserves for emergencies or to effect savings
through increased efficiency or changing conditions.
Within agencies and departments, authority is extended downward
through the allotment and sub-allotment processes. Administrative control
is exercised through the apportionment and allotment processes. Fiscal
control, which consists of the maintenance of prescribed accounting records,
is exercised and administered by the Treasury Department and the appro-
priate agency.
Audit Phase
Auditing functions are carried out on a continuous basis by the Gen-
eral Accounting Office. While the Bureau of the Budget acts as the Presi-
dent's staff arm in budgeting matters, the General Accounting Office is
responsible directly to Congress and, through audit procedures, ensures




Although audits are generally conducted to insure the legality of finan-
cial transactions, greater emphasis is being placed on financial management
practices and their improvement. The Secretary of the Treasury, the Direc-
tor of the Bureau of the Budget, and the Comptroller of the United States form
the Joint Financial Management Improvement Program, a committee designed
to strengthen financial management practices in the Federal government in
order to improve management needs of both the executive and legislative
branches of government.
During recent years many studies and experiments have been donducted
with a view to improving budgetary techniques. It is now generally recognized
that budgeting provides a very powerful management tool when properly used.
The following chapters will describe recent developments in the Department
of Defense budgeting system.
Annual Report of the Joint Financial Management Improvement
Program for Fiscal Year 196 1, December 12, 196 F, p. 3.

CHAPTER III
ATTEMPTS AT PERFORMANCE BUDGETING, 1947-1961
At the end of World War II hostilities, reforms to improve the con-
tent and presentation of the Federal budget began to gather momentum in all
areas of government activities. Most attempts were directed at improving
budgetary techniques in an effort to develop a more meaningful and adequate
budgetary mechanism capable of dealing with the ever -increasing and com-
plex functions of government.
Soon after the war, a task group in the Navy Department undertook
to streamline the archaic appropriation structure. As a result of these the
Navy, in 1946, presented its 1948 budget estimates in two alternate forms.
One represented the traditional basis of classifying estimates, while the
other represented an attempt to classify estimated requirements in terms
of functions or programs, rather than in terms of the goods and services to
be purchased.
After overcoming the initial resistance presented by the Bureau of
the Budget, both forms were submitted to Congress. However, the Legisla-
tive Branch chose to ignore the new proposal of estimating requirements on
a program basis.
Frederick C. Mosher, Program Budgeting; Theory and Practice




National Security Ac t, 1947
The problems which followed the passage of the National Security Act
of 1947 revived interest in the importance of the military budget.
The National Security Act of 1947 set up a National Military Estab-
lishment headed by a Secretary of Defense for the purpose of providing gen-
eral direction, authority, and control over the three military departments.
This Act created a new military layer having limited authority over the
Army, Navy, and Air Force. Although the Act recognized the World War II
Joint Chiefs of Staff as principal advisors to the President, Secretary of
Defense, and the National Security Council, each department retained
authority in certain matters to address itself directly to the Bureau of the
2
Budget, the President, and even the Congress.
Mr. James Forrestal, a strong advocate of this system, became the
first Secretary of Defense and 'worked with this arrangement for two years
by which time he was convinced that the views he had espoused just wouldn't
3
work. " Shortly after passage of the bill, the first Secretary of Defense
became gravely concerned over budgetary matters.
Forrestal's problems during late 1947 and more particularly dur-
ing 1948 in preparing and presenting an integrated defense budget have
had considerable significance in the development of unification as well
as in recent budgeting in the Defense Department. The open appeals
David Novick, Program Budgeting in the Department of Defense
(The RAND Corporation, Memorandum RM-4210-RC, September, 1964),
p. 1.
2 3Mosher, op. cit. , p. 31. Novick, op. cit. , p. 1.
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by the Air Force for more than the Defense Department had approved
for it; the later requests by the Army for more than had been approved;
the passing by Congress Of appropriations above Presidential requests
for the Air Force and the President's subsequent impounding of funds *-
ail these attest to the significance of the budget and to the weakness ox
the position of the Secretary of Defense. Forrestal tried, with doubtful
success, to work through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. . . . Although the
Secretary of Defease could compel the Chiefs of Staff to re-examine
their budgetary demands, he had no oower to force them to arrive at
real agreement within an aoproved ceiling. *
First Hoover Commission
During this period of budgetary frustration the (Hoover) Commission
on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government formed a task
group to study the Department of Defense. The reports made by this task
group emphasized the need to give the Secretary of Defense greater authority
over the Army, Navy, and Air Force, with particular reference to their fund
requests and expenditures. Shortly thereafter, the Hoover Commission itself
submitted its recommendations.
The Commission advocated that the Secretary of Defense be endowed
with greater executive power and that the three service secretaries be desig-
nated "Under Secretaries of Defense. It was further recommended that,
subject only to the authority of the President, the Secretary of Defense
should become the center of administrative authority in all matters including
the preparation of the military budget as well as control over expenditures of
2
funds as appropriated by Congress. The 1949 amendments to the National
Security Act closely followed the recommendations of the Commission by
1 2Mosher, op. cit. » p. 32. Ibid. , p. 33.
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asserting the executive authority of the Secretary of Defense over the Army,
Navy, and Air Force.
Another significant recommendation was made by the Hoover Commis-
sion regarding the budget concepts of the Federal Government. In a report
to Congress the Hoover Commission stated: 'We recommend that the whole
budgetary concept of the Federal Government should be refashioned by the
adoption of a budget based upon function, activities, and projects: this we
designate as a 'performance budget. ' M
Title IV, 1949
As a consequence of this recommendation and the work of a task
force under the direction of Mr. Ferdinand Eberstadt, Title IV was approved
by Congress and included as a part of the National Security Act amendments.
Title IV was a significant landmark in the financial management of
the Department of Eefense. It provided for the establishment of a Comptrol-
ler for the Department of Defense as a whole, as well as a Comptroller in
each of the three military departments. Also of equal significance was a
directive by Congress that the Department of Defense orepare a performance-
type budget as recommended by the Hoover Commission.
As defined by the Hoover Commission, a performance budget is one
which is based on functions, activities, and projects:
Such an approach would focus attention uoon the general character
and relative importance of the work to be done or upon the service to
Budgeting and Accounting, a report to the Congress by the Commis-
sion on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, February,
1949 (Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, February, 1949), p. 8L
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be rendered, rather than upon the things to be acquired, such as per-
sonal services, supplies, equipment, and so on. These latter objects
are, after all, only the means to an end. The all -important thing in
budgeting is the work or the service to be accomplished, and what
that work or service will cost.
Under performance budgeting, attention is centered on the function
or activity- -on the accomplishment of the purpose- -instead of on lists
of employees or authorizations of purchases. *
A performance-type budget took some time to take a firm, hold in the
Department of Defense. The Hoover Commission indicated what should be
2
done, but not how it could be done. Although the word program was not
used specifically by the Hoover Commission, it is assumed by many that the
Commission was in fact referring to a "program budget. Mosher defines
performance budgeting as follows:
The central idea of the performance budget is deceptively simple.
It is that the budget process be focused upon programs and functions
--that is, accomplishments to be achieved, work to be done. Per-
formance budgeting is essentially synonymous with what has long been
referred to as program budgeting. 5
David Novick, head of the Cost Analysis Department for the RAND Corpora-
tion, agrees that the Commission was referring to a programing concept,
at least similar to the program concept used by the War Production Board
in World War II. He substantiates his point of view as follows:
My reason for making this statement is the knowledge that a major




David Novick, Efficiency and Economy in Government through New
Budgeting and Accounting Procedures (The RAND Corporation, Memorandum






Ferdinand Eberstadt. Ebers_tadt as Program Vice Chairman of the
WPB /War Production Board / from September 1942 until March 1943
probably did more than any other single person to recognize the need
for programing in over -all terms and to foster and encourage the
development of the tools which WPB used to do the programing job.
In the WPB Eberstadt was dealing with programs like landing
craft, tanks, or bomber aircraft in terms of the steel, aluminum or
copper which they cost. *
Reclassi fication of Appropriation Titles
The first obstacle to the implementation of a performance budget was
one of classification. Mosher considers that the first and most significant
change toward a performance budget was essentially in the form of classifi-
cation. The Bureau of the Budget took the first steo and developed a broad
classification of the basic functions as a whole and amended the aopropriation
structure for the various agencies. As a consequence, a considerable reduc-
tion in the number of individual appropriations was effected, and individual
agencies proceeded to develop internal classifications and division of activi-
2
ties, programs, functions, and projects.
The original attempt by each service to design its individual appro-
priation structure resulted in considerable variations among the services.
The Navy reduced its appropriations from fifty-two to twenty-one as listed
below:
1. Military Personnel, Navy
2. Military Personnel, Naval Reserve
David Novick, Which Program Do We Mean in Program Budgeting -
(The RAND Corporation, Memorandum P-530, May 12, 1954).




3. Military Personnel, Officer Candidates
4. Navy Personnel, General Expenses
5. Military Personnel, Marine Corps
6. Military Personnel, Marine Corps Reserve
7. Marine Corps Troops and Facilities
8. Aircraft and Facilities
9. Construction of Aircraft and Related Procurement
10. Ships and Facilities
11. Shipbuilding and Conversion
12. Ordnance and Facilities





18. Service-wide Supply and Finance
19. Service -wide Operations
20. Operation and Conservation of Naval Petroleum Reserves
21. Naval Petroleum Reserve 4, Alaska.
Although the above classification denoted a significant improvement over that
previously used, it represented a rearrangement which was primarily or-
ganizational in nature rather than functional. This was further emphasized




one or more appropriation.
The Army, on the other hand, reduced the number of appropriation
titles from twenty-one to eight and classified them as follows:
1. Military Personnel, Army
2. Maintenance and Operations, Army
3. Procurement and Production, Army
4. Research and Development, Army
5. Military Construction, Army
6. Army National Guard
7. Reserve Personnel Requirement
8. Military Construction, Army Civilian Components.
Unlike the Navy, the Army appropriation structure was based on a cost cate
gory basis in contract with the Navy appropriations based on an organiza-
2
tional basis.
The Air Force attempt to segregate capital from operating costs and
group together broad categories or elements of cost was evidenced in the
following appropriation titles:
1. Aircraft and Related Procurement
2. Major Procurement other than Aircraft
3. Acquisition and Construction of Real Property
4. Maintenance and Operations
1 2
Ibid., pp. 86-87. Ibid. , pp. 88-89.
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5. Research and Development
6. Reserve Personnel Requirement
7. Air National Guard
8. Contingencies.
In order to provide some form of compatibility among the three serv-
ices, the Department of Defense established in 1950 a classification of Budget
Categories. This was an effort by the department to provide a method for
summarizing and comparing the total cost of the three services. Budget cate-
gories were established as follows:
1. Military Personnel Costs
2. Maintenance and Operation
3. Major Procurement and Production Costs
4. Acquisition and Contruction of Real Property
5. Civilian Components





As a result of these efforts by each of the three services and the
Department of Defense as a whole, there was a general assumption that the
modifications resulted in a performance budget as recommended by the Hoover
*Ibid.
, p. 87. Ibid.
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Commission. Mosher does not consider that the Department of Defense had
a performance budget as intended by the Hoover Commission. In his evalua-
tion of the above developments, Mosher states:
Obviously, in any large organization, there is a variety of different
ways of defining "functions, activities, and projects, and the problem
may soon be reduced to one of semantics and of differing oerspectives.
A more fruitful approach to the question is to appraise the classifica-
tion in the degree to which it contributes to the over -all purposes of
budgeting. The purposes fail into two basic classes: the improvement
of executive and legislative review and decision, and the facilitation of
effective internal administration.
Mosher admits that the classifications were a tremendous improvement over
the former classifications. However, nowhere in the Department of Defense
budget could anyone find answers to such basic questions as how much pro-
tection or how much insurance would be provided by the budget, or how much
more or less protection would result if an increase or reduction in the budget
were made.
The budget classifications of the three services were essentially a
grouping of the costs of supporting elements rather than of operating ele-
ments. The budget failed to provide information in a form suitable for
' 2
appraisal in terms of the fundamental purposes of military activity.
In his book Mosher suggests the need for reassessing the role of
budgeting and perhaps improving it in order to make it a more meaningful
and useful tool for those within the executive departments as well as for









A primary need is a tailoring of budgetary systems and classifica-
tion to the requirement of the different purposes they are intended to
serve. This means, in effect, two different budget systems: one
designed for the development, appraisal and authorization of future
policies and programs at top levels; the other, to facilitate internal
programing, management, and control. These we shall refer to re-
spectively as the program budget and the administrative budget. *
Mosher then proposes a sample program budget classification for the Ar-^y
as follows:
Combat Operations (if any)
Overseas Noncombat Operations





Services (not directly allocable).
David Novick, however, challenges Mosher' s proposed classification. "
He agrees that Mosher' s classification is a further improvement over the
classification adopted by the Department of Defense. However, the classifi-
cation proposed by Mosher still falls short of the purposes of the program
budget which he himself visualized- -that is, to assist in program development
and facilitate programing, management, and control.
1 2
Ibid.
, p. 237. Ibid. , p. 238.
3




It /Mosher's classification/ does not define these activities into
meaningful or complete units, that is, the armored division equipped
with tank model X, Y, or A. It also separates such highly interde-
pendent activities as the operation and support of active forces in
the United States" and training from the units which in the end con-
sume either the support or the training. In other words, to be
effective, the program, should be a device for tying together all of
the activities which enter into the armored force division as a sim-
ple unit of performance.
Perhaps equally important, there must be a clear-cut distinction
between those elements of the program which are designed for recur-
ring annual operating expense and those elements which are for the
capital or one-time outlay part of the program. Capital expenditures
are for the creation of the bases and depots, the initial procurement
of the equipment, the investment in the training of men, etc. These
are quite different in both magnitude and timing from the recurring
expenditures required to maintain the unit at its rated efficiency. *
The above discussion briefly describes the numerous attempts made
to implement the Hoover Commission's recommendation of a performance
budget which would focus attention upon the nature and the relative signifi-
cance of the task to be performed rather than upon the things to be acquired.
Despite the significant improvements that were inaugurated by the
Department of Defense subsequent to the enactment of the National Security
Act of 1947, Title IV of the amendments in 1949, and the Budget and
Accounting Procedures Act of 1950, implementation of an efficient and
effective planning, programing, and budgeting system was not made until
the appointment of Mr. Robert S. McNamara as Secretary of Defense and




AN INTEGRATED PLANNING/PROGRAMING /BUDGETING SYSTEM
Getting Started
In 1958 President Dwight D. Eisenhower recognized the need to expe-
dite and fortify the unification process of the Department of Defense. The
Defense Reorganization Act of 1958, which he advocated, created unified
operational commands. This Act gives full recognition to the fact that the
operations of each of the services are important not so much as individual
actions but as parts of a combined effort. Although this Act set the stage
for full integration of military activities, realization of this concept was not
effected until the appointment of Robert S. McNamara as Secretary of
Defense.
When he became Secretary of Defense in January 1961, McNamara
was given two instructions by President John F. Kennedy:
First, develop the military structure necessary for a solid founda-
tion for our foreign policy, and to do this without regard to arbitrary
or predetermined budget ceilings.
Second, having determined that force structure, procure and
operate it at the lowest possible cost.
Novick, Program Budgeting ... » op. cit. , p. 2.
2
Robert S. McNamara, "U. S. Defense Policy: A Balanced Military




Despite the many innovations and reforms implemented in the Depart-
ment of Defense prior to his arrival, Secretary McNamara soon realized
that the existing system did not provide means for integrating military plan-
ning with resource requirements. Although as Secretary he was responsible
for presenting the over -all Department of Defense budget, he did not in fact
possess an integrated budget but rather a combination of three separate
departmental budgets prepared by the Army, Navy, and Air Force. Further
more, the budget as presented did not provide any way of sorting out the
major categories of resources and relating them to major military objec-
1
tives.
In a speech delivered before the Democratic Platform Committee,
Secretary of Defense McNamara related his impressions of the Department
as he found it upon becoming Secretary of Defense:
The Defense Department we found in 1961 was one in which each
military service made its own independent plans. We found the Army
relying on air-lift which the Air Force was unable to provide. We
found the Army envisioning a long war, stockpiling supplies for as
long as two years; while the Air Force, envisioning a short war, had
supplies for only a few days.
In 1961, we found military strategy to be the stepchild of a prede-
termined budget. A financial ceiling was placed on national security
and funds were allocated not on the basis of military requirements,
but according to the dictates of an arbitrary fiscal policy.
Novick, Program Budgeting . . . , op. cit . , p. 3.




Purpose of the System
Early in 1961 Secretary McNamara was joined by Charles J. Hitch
as Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). Shortly thereafter, the
Secretary announced that a major effort would be undertaken to bridge" the
gap between planning and budgeting by means of a programing system.
The first formal step toward establishing an integrated planning/
programing /budgeting system was contained in a directive by Mr. Hitch to
the military departments. The fundamental objectives of the new system
were set forth by Mr. Kitch as follows:
To integrate the planning and programing and the financial manage-
ment functions in order to provide better tools for decision making by
the Secretary of Defense and his military advisors; and to create a
planning and programing /financial management system that is keyed
to a continuous program decision making and not just geared to the
annual budget cycle. In such a system not only would budget decisions
be program decisions, as they inevitably are now, but program deci-
sions would be budget decisions. That is, decisions to embark on pro-
grams would be explicitly decisions to provide the resources required
to carry them out. *
The purpose of the new system is to provide the Secretary of Defense
and his advisors with an adequate and effective managerial tool by introducing
some rationale into the military decision-making process. The Navy Pro-
graming Manual enumerates in detail the major objectives of the new pro-
graming system. These are listed as:
U. S. , Department of the Navy, Office of the Comptroller, Program
Change Control System in the Department of the Navy , NAVEXOS P-2416
(August, 1962), p. 1-1,
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1. Planning oriented around major missions . Program planning
is done on the basis of broad military missions which cut across tra-
ditional organizational lines, rather than on the basis of unilateral
plans and priorities of individual Services.
2. Ability to relate resource inputs to military outputs. The
programing system is designed to provide both financial and non-
financial estimates of the resource inputs required over time in order
to obtain specified time -phased military outputs.
3. Coordination of long -range planning with budgeting . Budgets
and funding decisions must be compatible with long-range programing
decisions. Budgeting will continue to involve close scrutiny of detailed
resource requirements needed during the relatively short-range budget-
ing period, but any decisions made at this stage should normally be
compatible with currently approved programs.
^* Continuous appraisal of programs . The programing system
must provide a means for continuous review of program, decisions and
a mechanism for changing the programs whenever a need for a change
is recognised. Budgeting and funding, tied as they are to the annual
appropriation cycle, must, of course, continue on an annual basis; but
this does not in any way preclude continuous appraisal of long-range
programs.
5* Progress reporting . Control of approved programs must be
exercised through a system of progress reports which highlight signifi-
cant deviations from approved plans so that timely action may be taken.
6. Ability to make cost-effectiveness studies . The programing
system must provide a routine capability for making cost-effectiveness
studies of alternative force structures. The costing techniques used
must be accurate enough to provide a basis for comparing programs,
yet at the same time responsive enough to allow frequent studies of
many alternatives without imposing repeated burdensome workloads on
Department of Defense personnel.
-7. Integration of Department of Defense information systems . The
programing system imposes rather heavy requirements for information
on the Services. Other reporting systems having similar requirements
should be revised in order to avoid duplication. Through such a process,
the programing system can play a major role in the development of an
integrated Office of the Secretary of Defense management system. 1
Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
The Navy Programming Manual: Part I , Programming Over view , OPNAV
(September, 1964), p. 1-2-2.
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Basic Elements of the System
Although the objectives of the planning /programing /budgeting syste
are many and varied, the structure of the system can be reduced to five
major and basic elements: (1) a program structure defined in terms of mis-
sions, forces, and weapons systems; (2) an analytical study and comparison
of possible alternatives; (3) an approved five-year force structure and finan-
cial program updated on a year-round basis to reflect current requirements;
(4) year-round decision making on new programs and required changes; and
(5) a system of progress reporting to evaluate the validity and administration
of the plan.
Mr. G. H. Fisher, also from, the RAND Corporation, looks upon
program budgeting as a system involving essentially three primary consid-
erations: structural, analytical process, and information systems.
The structural aspects, or format, pertain to the establishment of a
set of categories oriented toward end objectives or missions which are
meaningful for long-range planning. Emphasis is olaced on projections of
some five to ten years into the future in contract to the conventional budget
system which stresses functional and object class categories over a short
time horizon.
The analytical process pertains to the various studies which are car-
ried out as an integral part of the programing system. The primary purpose
1
David Novick, Program Budgeting: Long -Range Planning in the
Department of Defense (The RAND Corporation, Memorandum RM-3359-
ASDC, November, 1962), p. 3.
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of the analytical process is to assist the decision maker by clarifying, in
terms of cost and effectiveness, the various alternatives open to him in a
particular program, area.
The information system is designed to support the first two by pro-
viding progress reporting and control as well as information for the analyti-
cal process which requires making estimates of benefits and costs of alter-
native future courses of action.
Laying the Foundation
The Defense programing system reflects Mr. Hitch's extensive
studies on the need for such a system in the Department of Defense. In 1948,
Mr. Hitch joined the RAND Corporation, a firm of scientific consultants
engaged in government research. Mr. Hitch remained an employee of RAND
Corporation until he was appointed Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptrol-
ler) in February, 1961. While at RAND Mr. Hitch took active part in a num-
ber of Defense studies sponsored by the Air Force. During this period he
lectured to selected Air Force audiences on the subject of 'Systems Analy-
sis. " The content of these lectures was condensed in a RAND Corporation
2
publication. It was also during this period that Mr. Hitch co -authored the
3book The Econom ics of Defense in the Nuclear Age
.
G. H. Fisher, The Role of Cost-Utility Analysis in Program Budget-
ing (The RAND Corporation, Memorandum RM-4279-RC, September 1964), 1.
Charles J. Hitch, An Appreciation of Systems Analysis (The RAND
Corporation, Memorandum P-699, August 18, 1955).
^Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The E conomics of Defense
in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, I960).
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Upon taking office as Assistant Secretary of Defense, Mr. Hitch
recognized the need for improvement in programing systems. He visualized
the introduction of a program /budgeting system as a long and laborious task,
consuming a period of several years. This time span, however, was abbre-
viated considerably by Secretary of Defense McNamara, who set the formu-
lation of the defense budget for the Fiscal Year 1963 as an initial objective.
In March of 1961, Secretary McNamara indicated to the Military
Departments that the FY 1963 budget would be developed as the out-
growth of a 3 -phase operation as follows:
1. Review of military requirements
2. Formulation and review of programs to implement
military requirements, extending several years into the future.
3. Development of the annual budget estimates. *
Up to this time military planning and financial management had been
treated as independent activities. The planning function had been performed
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the various planning organizations of each
military department. Budgeting on the other hand was the domain of the
Comptroller. Planning was done in terms of military services, forces and
major weapons systems and projected over a period of several years. Budg-
eting on the other was done in terms of budgeting classification and projected
2
for only one year. In order to bridge this gap" between planning and
budgeting, the Secretary established a Programming Office under Mr. Hitch,
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). See Figure 3, page 37.
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This office was given the following duties and responsibilities:
1. To assemble, consolidate, and present the physical programs
of the services and all other agencies of the Department of Defense.
2. To translate these physical programs into financial summaries
and present them in several ways; i. e. , by time period; by initial in-
vestment and annual operating costs; by new obligational authority,
obligations, and expenditures; by mission or task; by weapon syste
and by appropriation category.
3. To provide in the same manner the total financial implications
of new or alternative programs. *
The Programming Office as originally established by the Secretary
was headed by a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Programming), a
position held by Mr. Hugh McCullough. The office consists of two director-
ates. The Directorate for Systems Analysis, under the leadership of Dr.
Alain C. Enthoven, is responsible for the critical examination and analysis
of alternative future weapon systems and forces as well as their modes of
employment and deployment. The Directorate for System Planning is
responsible for obtaining, integrating, analyzing, and presenting pertinent
financial and non-financial data and information for decision making at the
2
Office of the Secretary of Defense level.
The review and requirement phase commenced in March, 1961. Dur-
ing this phase some one hundred study projects were initiated, dealing with
military requirements problems in critical and difficult areas of national




G. H. Fisher, The New OASD (Comptroller) Programming/ Budgeting
Process (A Lecture for the AFSC Cost Analysis Course) (The RAND Corpora-




1. The need for and emphasis to be placed on:




Domestic and foreign military bases and
installations
2. The quality of conventional war forces and how to
improve them
3. The development of a new tactical fighter aircraft
4. Description of a ten-year shipbuilding program.
Most of these studies were conducted at the Office of the Secretary
of Defense level, with necessary inputs being provided by the three military
departments.
The formulation and review of programs commenced in May, 1961.
This phase comprised three major components: (1) the military departmental
submissions of program proposals for the fiscal years 1963-1967; (2) a crit-
ical examination of the range of alternative programs by the Secretary of
Defense and his military advisors and staffs; and (3) the issuance of guide-
lines to the military departments. These guidelines were to be expressed
in program terms and were to serve as the basis for the preparation of
departmental budgets for the Fiscal Year 1963.





The directive issued to the military departments by the Secretary of
Defense set forth the task to be accomplished as follows:
During the requirements and programing phases, the Secretary of
Defense, with his military advisors and his staff, will examine a range
of alternative programs and make decisions that will form the basis for
guidance to the services on the preparation of the Fiscal Year 1963
budget. During the programing phase, attention will be focused on
choice from among alternative programs to achieve the national secur-
ity objectives outlined in the basic national security policy paper. For
this purpose, cost and effectiveness comparisons will be made, for the
most part using statistical cost estimates and factors rather than the
more detailed information supporting the final budget submission. '
As a result of these submissions and the ensuing analysis, the entire
defense effort was organized into nine military programs, henceforth to
serve as the only authorized basis for the preparation of annual budgets.
The original list of program, packages' was published as follows:
1. Central War Offensive Forces
2. Central War Defense Forces
3. General Purpose Forces
4. Sealift and Airlift
5. Reserve and National Guard Forces
6. Research and Development
7. Service -wide Support
8. Classified Projects
9. Other Department of Defense projects.
"Deoartmant of the Navy, Program Change Control System




Each of the above packages was further divided int > segments referrec'
to as elements. As an illustration, the elements contained in package number
one would embrace:
1. Aircraft Forces (B-52, B-58, B-47, RB-47, KC-97, and
B-70)
2. Missile Forces, Land-based (Atlas, Titan, ^inuteman,
Thor, and Jupiter)
3. Missiles, Sea-based (FBM system, Regulus)
4. Command, Control and Communication (465D)
5. Headquarters and Command Support.
The programs listed above formed the basis for the preparation of
the budget estimates for the Fiscal Year 1963. The main objective of the
system as established is to bridge the gap between planning and budgeting.
This is achieved through the integration of the planning, programing, and
financial functions in such a way that budget decisions become program deci-
1
sions, and program decisions become budget decisions. This is a signifi-
cant improvement over the conventional methods of planning and budgeting
previously used by the Department of Defense. In the words of Roswell
Gilpatric, former Deputy Secretary of Defense:
G. H. Fisher, The New GASP
. . . , op. cit. , pp. 10-11.
2
G. H. Fisher, Some Comm ents on Program Budgeting in the Depar t-




In the past, the Defense Department has often developed its force
structure by starting with a budget and sending it off in search of a
program. Our new system of program packaging has reversed this
procedure, by first determining our over -all strategy, then fitting
the hardware and the manpower to those objectives. Instead of look-
ing at separate budgets for the three military departments, we now
look at specific missions --such as our strategic nuclear force, our
air defense force, or our airlift and sealift--as individual program
packages whose total content cuts across traditional service lines. *
A summary of the Navy Department 1963 Fiscal Year budget plan in
terms of program packages and appropriation titles is shown in Figure 4,
page 43.
The Program Structure
Programs and Program Elements
Programming involves the planning and control of resource inputs
to achieve a desired military output. It is concerned with the cost,
feasibility, and effectiveness of alternative methods of meeting mili-
tary requirements in order to get the greatest benefit out of any given
resource expenditure. Since programing involves both military outputs
and resource inputs, a structure must be available for defining each of
them in consistent terms. 2
The integration of planning, programing, and budgeting is achieved
through the designation of major 'program ' and "program elements. " Pro-
gram elements are the basic building blocks of the programing system. They
are considered entities upon which vital decisions are made determining the
over -all military strength. These units form the basis for planning and
G. H. Fisher, The New GASP . . . , op. cit. , p. 5.
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programing of forces, dollar costs, and manpower. A program element is
defined as follows:
The program element is the smallest unit of military output con-
trolled at the Department of Defense level. An integrated combination
of rnen, equipment and facilities which together constitute an identifi-
able military capability or support activity. The Fleet Ballistic Mis-
sile System, " Attack Carriers, FORRESTAL Class, and Recruit
Training, Navy" are examples of t>rogram elements. Ail program ele-
ments taken together constitute the complete Defense Establishment.
To put it another way, every DOD activity falls within one of the pro-
gram elements.
Major programs are directed at specifically designated military mis-
sions. They are made up of interrelated groups of program elements which
are considered together either because they support each other or because
they are designated as close substitutes for each other.
Cost Categories
As an additional aid to decision making, the cost of each orogram ele-
ment is broken down into three categories, each of which has its own particu-
lar significance in the decision-making process. The three categories are:
(1) Research and Development; (2) Initial Investment; and (3) Annual Operating
Costs.
Research and development represents all costs associated with the
development of a new weapon or capability to the point where it is ready for
operational use. Since the cost of development taken by itself may run into





major management decision. This cost category includes the cost of develop-
ing the actual equipment as well as related costs involved in facilities, supply,
and personnel costs.
The investment category represents the costs beyond the development
phase. These are the one-time or initial outlays required to bring a new sys-
tem or capability into operational use. These costs include the original out-
lay for the equipment as well as the costs necessary for the initial stocks of
spares and supplies. If a piece of new equipment requires additional training
of personnel, the cost incurred for initial training is also added to investment
costs. These costs are most significant to the decision maker as they often
involve outlays of over one billion dollars.
The operating costs are the annual recurring costs required to man,
operate, and maintain the capability. It is possible that the cost of maintain-
ing a system over its expected life is more significant than the original invest-
ment costs. Operating costs must therefore be considered in the initial man-
agement decision to select and produce one weapon system as compared with
another.
In defense decision making, costs are examined over a spectrum of
time. It is the total cost of the program which is truly significant, not
merely the increment which relates to the current yearly budget. When-
ever a decision is reached on a program it carries an imolicit commit-
ment into the future. The full implications should be studied before the
commitment is mace. *
Department of the Navy, Program Change Control System . . . ,
op. cit
.
, pp. 2-6 and 2 - 7
.
^Hugh McCullough, New Concepts in Defense Planning, Programming
and Budgeting, The Federal Accountant , Vol. 12, No. 1 (September 1962), 75,
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The principle behind the cost category and time phasing is illustrated
in Figure 5, page 47.
Resource Categories
Although primary emphasis in decision making is placed on program
elements, situations do arise when decisions must be made regarding specific
resource inputs below the program element level. In order to provide for
decisions of this sort, all inputs are classified into one of four resource cate-
gories: equipment; military construction; manpower; and functions and activi-
ties related to operation and maintenance. The sum of all categories equals
the total resource requirements for the Department of Defense.
Resource categories are listed in either of two annexes of the Five
Year Force Structure and Financial Plan. The Material Annex lists the m^re
important procurement items in two parts. The first is a shonping list of
items exceeding two million dollars in any one year. The second is the
weapons dictionary which provides descriptive information of the require-
ments. The Construction Annex lists the approved construction projects for
the current year plus the following five years.
Five Year Force Structure
and Financial Plan
On completion of the budgeting phase for the Fiscal Year 1963, the
military departments were instructed to up-date program packages and
Department of the Navy, The Navy Programming Manual . . .
,
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elements to reflect changes imposed during the budget review and legislative
process. At that time the departments were also required to come up with
suggestions for specific improvements. As a result of these studies, the
word "packages" was dropped from the term "Program Packages, and the
program nomenclature was revised as well as the list of elements making up
the programs.
The major programs and a general description of each appear in
Figure 6, page 49.
Program elements contained in the Strategic Retaliatory Force,
program 1, are listed in Figure 7, page 50.
On completion of these studies, the Secretary of Defense in April,
1962, issued his Five Year Force Structure and Financial Program. This
document was essentially a planning tool, a map showing where the Depart-
ment of Defense hoped to move over the next five years. It established the
approved force structure and financial levels for a period of five years from
Fiscal Year 1963 to 1967, inclusive. In his letter to the military depart-
ments Mr. McNamara stated that "unless a program was contained in the
book it had no official approval. "
The Program Element Summary Data sheets, Figure 8, page 51,
together with all the supporting information such as the description of the
forces, their task and missions, procurement lists, facilities lists, etc.
,
Department of the Navy, Program Change Control System . . . ,
op. cit. , p. 3-1.
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Program Strategic Retaliatory For ces - the forces which are designed to
I carry out the long-range strategic mission and to carry the main
burden of battle in general. They include the long-range bombers,
the air-to-ground and decoy missiles, and the refueling tankers;
the land -based and submarine -based strategic missiles; and the
systems for their command and control.
** Continental Air and Missile Defense Forces - those weapon sys-
tems, warning and communications networks, and ancillary equip-
ment required to detect, identify, track, and destroy unfriendly
forces approaching the North American continent.
^ General Purpose Forces - the forces relied upon to perform the
entire range of combat operations short of general nuclear war.
These include most of the Army's combat and combat support
units, virtually all Navy units, all Marine Corps units, and the
tactical units of the Air Force.
IV Airlift and Sealift Forces - those airlift and sealift forces required
to move troops and cargo promptly to wherever they might be
needed. Included in the airlift forces are both the MATS trans-
ports and the Air Force Tactical Air Command troop carrier air-
craft. The sealift forces include the troop ships, cargo ships,
and tankers operated by the Military Sea Transport Service and
the Forward Floating Bases. "
V Reserve and National Guard Force s - equipment, training, and
administration of the Reserve and National Guard personnel of
the several services.
^ Research and Development - all research and development effort
not directly identified with elements of other programs- -i. e.
,
where there has been no decision to produce for inventory.
VII General Support - support activities of the several services and
the agencies which serve the entire Department of Defense. It
constitutes an "all other 1 ' or residual category of activities or
programs and includes all costs not capable of being directly or
meaningfully allocated to the other major programs.
^** Civil Defense - Federal assistance for fall-out shelters, warning
and radiological monitoring systems, training and education for
emergency preparedness, etc.
Source: David Novick, Program Budgeting in the Department of Defense (The
RAND Corporation, Memorandum RM -4210 -RC, Sept. 1964), 13-14.



















Missile Force s , Sea-Based
Polaris System
Regulus System
Command Control, Communications and Support
SAC Control System (465L)
PACCS {KC-135/B-47
UHF Emergency Rocket Communications System (ERCS)
Base Operating Support
Advanced Flying and Missile Training
Headquarters and Command Supoort
Source: David Novick, Program Budgeting in the Department of Defense (The
RAND Corporation, Memorandum RM-4210-RC, Sept. 1964), p. 15.
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collectively constitute the Five Year Force Structure and Financial Program.
The Five Year Force Structure and Financial Plan is basically a sum-
mary of all approved programs for the Department of Defense. An approved
force structure projected eight years into the future and financial levels for
a five-year period are established for each of the services. The Five Year
Force Structure and Financial Plan for the Department of the Navy is published
in nine booklets.
The first booklet contains the forwarding memorandum and the fore-
word. The second consists of tables summarizing the Navy data in all
DOD programs. The last seven booklets contain Navy program elements
or summary data and descriptive data sheets, arranged by code number,
and broken down into the seven DOD major programs. *
It should be noted that the Five Year Force Structure and Financial
Program is a device used internally by the Department of Defense and does
not receive official sanction by the United States Congress.
The System and How It Works in the
United States Navy
Program Change Control System
Having laid the foundation of the programing system, there remained
to be established some method of making the system viable enough to adapt
itself to the ever -changing times. The accelerating pace of scientific
advancement through research and development confronts the decision maker





with an ever -widening range of marvelously effective, complex, and expensive
weapon systems.
The system ties all aspects of the defence effort together. National
Security objectives are related to strategy, strategy is related to forces,
forces to resources, and, finally, resources to costs. These are related in
such a fashion that a change in any one will require a change in all of the
others. The system must therefore be capable of interrelating the three
phases, planning, programming, and budgeting, as well as the other mana-
gerial functions of decision making, progress reporting, control, and
evaluation.
To accomplish this task the Secretary of Defense established a Pro-
gram Change Control System. The Five Year Force Structure and Financial
Plan can be looked upon as the heart of the entire system. As the heart in
the human body does, it must be capable of adapting itself to the requirements
of its internal organs as well as to the environment external to the syste
The Program Change Control System provides a mechanism for
maintaining an up-to-date approved Five Year Force Structure and Financial
Plan. The basic function of the procedure is to control and review the sub-
mission of Program Change Proposals by sponsors of the Department of
Defense.
Advantages of the Program Change Control System are that it:




2. Provides a method for additions, deletions, or modification
of the Five Year Force Structure and Financial Plan.
3. Provides for year-round decision making without regard
to the budget cycle.
4. Provides one channel for major decision making. (Up to
the Secretary of Defense if above authorized threshold. )
5. Provides a rapid and effective review for all proposed
changes.
6. Provides for decision making on the basis of the best
information available, making use of cost-effectiveness studies
and analysis of long-range cost implications.
7. Provides for uoward and downward communication.
Proposals flow upward and decisions flow downward as reflected
in the Five Year Force Structure and Financial Plan.
8. Provides for the assignment of responsibility for carry-
ing out decisions.
9. Provides progress reporting and evaluation.
Planning; and Programing
In order to visualize the system in motion, the remainder of this
chapter describes the entire cycle: planning, programing, and budgeting.
The first two phases --planning and programing --are conducted on a year-
round basis, while the last phase --budgeting --is a once-a-year operation
coinciding with the Federal budget cycle.
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Military planning is the first phase of the dec is ion -making process.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the planners within the military departments
coordinate the planning phase.
Planning and programing are really two aspects of the same process
and differ only in emphasis. Planning involves the selection of proper courses
of action after careful and systematic review of possible alternatives avail-
able. In planning, the objectives and the means of achieving objectives are
under continual review. Plans must be modified continually as new assump-
tions supersede the old, new intelligence information is received, or new
systems become available. "The preferred alternative remains preferred
only so long as no additional knowledge of program prowpects in relation to
2
other competitive systems dictates another choice. " Selection of the pre-
ferred feasible program is made only after careful analysis of projected costs
and effectiveness.
Programing, on the other hand, moves closer to actuality and concen-
trates on translating selected objectives into reality. Programing involves
the specific determination of the required manpower, material, facilities,
3
and their respective costs.
It is during these two phases that use is made of cost /effectiveness
studies. The planner and decision maker are not only interested in the










military effectiveness of a system, but they are concerned also about its cost
of development, initial investment, and operating costs. It is with the aid of
cost /effectiveness analysis that the decision maker can effect trade-offs
and obtain a balanced force structure.
Cost /effectiveness analysis provides an analytical method whereby
weapons of the future are placed in a simulated operational context and com-
pared with alternative proposals and existing systems. The primary objective
of this analysis is to systematically examine alternative courses of action in
terms of effectiveness and costs. Not only does it entail the identification of
alternatives open to the decision maker, but it also requires a clarification
of their respective implications. Cost /effectiveness analysis is not intended
to provide automatic decision making, but rather to sharnen the intuition and
judgment of the decision maker. "
There is a continuing requirement for strategic and naval warfare
systems studies in support of the Navy programming effort. Experience
has confirmed the value of operations research, systems analyses, and
analytically developed forecasts of political, technological, and military
trends which might influence the direction of Navy planning. An orderly
program of study and research facilitates the identification of selected
alternative actions, establishes an improved basis for the development
of plans* policies and naval force requirements, and provides a more
meaningful rationale for detailed planning and policy level decisions. 2
As previously mentioned, the Five Year Force Structure and Finan-
cial Plan serves as the only official approval of programs-- if a program is
Fisher, The Role of Coat . . . , op. cit. , p. v.
2





not contained in the book, it has no official approval. " Changes in appraisal
of the enemy threat, revisions of military policy, technological breakthrough,
to name a few, will necessitate changes in plans which in turn will require
changes to the Five Year Force Structure and Financial Plan. Proposed
changes may originate from the President down through the Secretary of
Defense or may be originated by the Military Departments, as applicable.
The Secretaries of each of the Military Departments have been delegated
authority to approve certain changes which do not exceed established
"thresholds. " These thresholds" represent a set of criteria which if
exceeded require approval by the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Although
the Deputy Secretary of Defense has authority to approve program changes,
the majority of Program Change Proposals receive Mr. McNamara's per-
sonal attention.
A Program Change Proposal is initiated by a Program Sponsor when-
ever a requirement exists for a new element to be added, or a major adjust-
ment or modification to an element is indicated, or a program element varies
significantly from the schedules and costs initially projected for it.
Program Change Proposals are processed within the Department of
the Navy in accordance with established administrative procedures. All
Program Change Proposals are submitted over the signature of the Secretary
of the Navy. Program Change Proposals dealing with Research and Develop-
ment are processed on DD Form 1355-1 (see Figure 9, pages 58, 59, and 60).
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on DD Form 1355-2, as shown in Figure 10 (pages 62, 63, and 64).
An extensive amount of back-up information and data is also submitted
in addition to the required forms. The following illustrates the type of addi-
tional information required:
i. Force structure and deployment commitments
2. Missions and tasks of the forces /weapon system /program
element
3. Description of major systems or equipments and their
performance characteristics
4. Description of supporting items, such as armament,
ship, and ground support equipment
5. Equipment status of the force /'weapon system /program
element
6. Status of supporting projects, such as research, evalua-
tion, test, military construction, special training, etc.
7. Maintenance, overhaul, and rework concepts and policies
8. Projected delivery schedules of forces or major weapons
systems (ships, aircraft and missiles)
9. Concepts and assumptions used in developing preposi-
tioned deterrent items and general mobilisation reserves.
Department of the Navy, Program Change Control System . . . ,
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Financial data are also submitted with Program Change Proposals
showing the full coat implications of Research and Development, Investment,
and Onerating costs (refer to Figure 5, page 47).
Within the Department of the Navy, Program Change Proposals
receive wide distribution for the purpose of evaluation by all concerned. The
Program Evaluation Center receives, processes, and controls all Program
Change Proposals from the time they are conceived and proposed by the pro-
gram sponsor until the final outcome is known. As an illustration, copies of
the Program Change Proposals are provided to: (1) the Comptroller for
analysis of financial implications; (2) the Director, Office of Analysis and
Review, for assessment of validity and reasonableness; (3) the Chief of Naval
Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps for an appraisal of the
proposal in their respective areas of responsibility; and (4) other offices as
appropriate or required.
Although changes may be proposed at any time during the year, the
majority of changes occur during the summer months following the annual
review of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan (JSOP), by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. Usually by August the Secretary of Defense has rendered the majority
of decisions regarding the changes. If approval is given, changes that were
communicated upward as proposals flow downward as commands. Decisions





appropriate department submits a Program Element Summary Data Form
acknowledging receipt of the authorized changes as well as updating the Five
Year Force Structure and Financial Plan.
In order to up-date the Five Year Force Structure and Financial Plan
for changes resulting from other than Program Change Proposals, program
elements and Materiel Annex data are submitted to the Office of the Secretary
of Defense at the following tim.es and for the following reasons: (1) in Decem-
ber, to record the President's budget decisions; (2) in May, to update and
advance the approved Five Year Force Structure and Financial Plan for one
additional year; and (3) in August, to reflect whatever changes may be
required as a result of appropriations made by Congress.
Budgeting
As indicated earlier, the planning and programing phases are per-
formed on a year-round basis. The budget phase remains a once-a-year
effort and follows the traditional Federal budget cycle. When the Secretary
of Defense calls for the annual budget, the military departments simply
develop the necessary budget requests by converting the appropriate year of
the Five Year Force Structure and Financial Plan into the traditional budget-
ary appropriation titles. This entails taking each of the major program and
program elements and converting this information into the traditional appro-
priation format. Figure 11, page 67, shows the concept of this conversion.
1
Ibid.





























Figure 12, page 69. shows the program and budget schedule for Fiscal Year
1964. The illustration shows a total of five inputs which may result in Program
Change Proposals. By mid-June all Program Change Proposals affecting the
Fiscal Year 1966 budget are due and submitted to the Secretary of Defense for
consideration. During the month of July, the Bureaus prepare the initial Fis-
cal Year 1966 budget estimates for submission to the Naval Comptroller by
the 15th of August.
During the ensuing period the Navy Department's internal budget review
is held. After the Secretary of Defense has made his decisions regarding the
Program Change Proposals, usually in September or early October, the budget
estimates are finalized and submitted to the Bureau of the Budget through
established administrative procedures.
Decisions on matters raised by the Joint Office of the Secretary of
Defense and the Budget Bureau review are communicated to the military
departments by the Secretary. Individual service secretaries may request
reconsideration of these decisions if they believe their case may be justified.
This leads fo the Subject /Issue" process, oooularly known as Operation
Snowflake.
Although the process just described may seem complicated, it repre-
sents an improvement over the methods used prior to 1961. Preparation of






Once a set of approved programs, fully rosted and with revenue
requirements within the limits of anticipated resources, have been
developed, the preparation of the annual budget is a relatively orderly
and painless process. There should be no need, Mr. Hitch has
said, for a hectic and hurried orogram review crammer int a few
weeks in the midst of the annual budget review. " The budget -making
ohase should consist essentially of converting a one -year slice of
approved long-term programs into appropriate budget format and
supporting detail. 1
The correlation between the basic budget and the Five Year Force
Structure for the Fiscal Year 1965 is illustrated in Figure 13 on page 71.
Cos t Information Sy stem
Supplementing the integrated planning /programing /budgeting system
are the two significant and related systems dealing with cost information and
progress reporting.
To provide effective management planning and control within the
framework of the defense planning /programing /budgeting system, the
Department of the Navy has developed a cost information system designed to
assist the decision maker. The system provides a means of associating dol-
lars with other resources for the units upon which decisions are made. The
system was designed by the Navy Department when faced with the need to
describe forces and their costing on a different basis than had previously
been called for and in a manner compatible with the traditional appropriation
2
structure.
Robert J. Massey, Program Packages and the Program Budget in
the Deoartment of Defense, Public Administration Review , March 1963, p. 32.
2
Department of the Navy, Office of the Comptroller, Department of the
Navy Cost Information System , Part I (NAVEXOS P-2412, Rev. 1, June 4,
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The cost information system consists of a library of basic data repre-
senting costs, quantities, physical resource characteristics, and a procedure
for keeping this information up to date.
The system provides management reports informing on current status
as well as useful information for control and decision making. Data provided
by the system are useful for: (1) interrelating and updating program and
budget data; (2) integrating report of progress against program and budget
plans; and (3) integrating material readiness into the information system.
A complete study of the Navy Cost Information system is beyond the
scope of this paper. However, its importance to the planning /programing/
2budgeting system cannot be underestimated.
Progres s Reporting
It can be said that planning and control go together. Effective man-
agement requires a reporting system capable of keeping management con-
stantly informed of the progress being made toward achieving objectives.
This enables management to take corrective action whenever performance
Department of the Navy, Program Change Control System . .
,
op. cit .
, pp. £-1 and 5-2.
2
For a more detailed discussion of the Navy Cost Information system,
see:
Department of the Navy, Office of the Comptroller, Department of the
Navy Cost Information System; Part I
,
(NAVEXOS P-2412, Rev. I, June 4,
1962), and
Department of the Navy Cost Information System: Part II, Structure
for Integrating Report of Progress against Program and Budget Plans
(NAVEXOS P-2412, July, 1962).
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exceeds acceptable deviations from established norma. Corrective action
may require more efficient performance or an alteration of the original plans.
In order to determine how closely the military departments are meet-
ing the base program in the Five Year Force Structure and Financial Plan,
a progress reporting system has been established for the Department of
Defense. Actual performance is reported and compared with the phasing of
programs enabling top management, when necessary, to make decisions
modifying a program or further implementing its execution.
Significant deviations are detected in sufficient time permitting timely
corrective action. Progress reporting involves two basic procedures: (1)
physical progress reporting and (2) accounting and reporting of obligations
and quantitative data.
In order to facilitate physical progress reporting, milestone schedules
have been established for the most important material items. Each month
the actual progress for the month and the anticipated progress for the ensuing
three months are compared with the established milestone for the period.
Any significant deviations from the established milestones are evaluated and
the resulting implications enumerated. The reports are prepared by author-
ized sponsors and forwarded to the Secretary of the Navy through normal
administrative channels.
Accounting and reporting of obligations provide the basis for proper
oianning and time phasing of the Material Annexes, Construction Annex, and
the Research and Development projects. The Material Annex Line Item
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Report, the Construction Annex Item Report, and tl e Research, Development,
Test and Evaluation Project Reports fall within this category.
The integrated planning /programing /budgeting system, together with
its peripheral systems of cost information and progress reporting, repre-
sents a significant improvement in military financial management.
Department of the Navy, Program Change Control System





A PROPOSED CANADIAN PROGRAMING SYSTEM 1
Introduction
Although preliminary studies for a defence programing system com-
menced during the early part of 1963, little was known of the Defence Pro-
gram Working Group's activities. The first official announcement of the
proposed system was made public in March 1964 by the Honourable Paul
Hellyer, Minister of National Defence. In his White Paper on Defence,
Mr. Hellyer introduced the concept of defence programing as follows:
It is intended to introduce into the Department of National Defence
a management system for planning and controlling major Defence pro-
grams at the departmental level. This system will display various
components of the long-term Defence program in suitable detail over
a significant time period. The system will provide a means of ex-
pressing various force structures, weapons systems, logistic arrange-
ments and other military activities in terms of their immediate and
long-term costs.
Material for this chapter was derived to a considerable extent from
the personal notes and files of Lieutenant Commander E. V. Marguetts of
the Royal Canadian Navy. Lieutenant Commander Marguetts was the naval
representative on the Defence Program Working Group' commissioned by
the Deputy Minister of National Defence, in November 1963, to develop ways
and means of establishing a Defence Programing system, suitable to meet
the needs of Canada's expanding and complex Department of National Defence.
As information contained in these files has not yet received official
sanction and bears security classifications, the scope of this chapter is





The main objectives of the system are:
(a) To assist too management in the department in
decision making by providing the means of analysing
and assessing various military programs and activi-
ties in terms which will relate military effectiveness
to financial costs, manpower requirements, equip-
ment needs, etc.
(b) To provide the type of data which will enable the
effects of defence decisions to be clearly expressed
in terms of forces, manpower, equipment, and money
both in the short term and over a period of years.
For this purpose, the total Canadian defence structure will be
grouped into a number of major programs. These programs will cover
all arms of the services and will be expressed in terms of major military
missions or objectives. Each program, will be analysed in appropriate
detail to reflect the military and civilian manpower, the major equip-
ments and the anticipated costs that are programed over a period of
years for the various elements of the Program. Projections of each
program will be reviewed annually.
This system will enable Defence Programs to be examined and con-
sidered in relation to their overall military effectiveness from the stand-
point of achieving a particular mission. It is hoped that the system will
enable defence resources to be allocated to Defence Programs in the
most effective manner from, the ooint of view of ultimate military output
and in accordance with a clear and detailed plan. *
Concurrent with the announcement of a Defence Programming System,
the Minister proclaimed his intention to integrate Canada's three Armed
Forces into a unified force under a single Chief of Defence Staff. Integration
at the top-management level was effected July 1, 1964. The Defence Program
Working group which was established under the tri-service regime became
extinct as its functions have been taken over by the Assistant Chief of Defence
Staff (Plans and Programs). As a result, the latest developments since inte-
gration cannot be readily determined and the following discussion is limited
Canada, White Paper on Defence (Ottawa: Quean's Printer, March
1964), p. 20 (by the Honorable Paul Hellyer and Lucien Cardin, Minister and
Assistant Minister of National Defence).
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to a Defence Programming System as viewed prior to integration. Integration
will obviously facilitate implementation as well as strengthen the programing
system.
Any comparison or research concerning a Canadian planning program-
ing/budgeting system must take into account some of the significant dissimi-
larities in the systems of government. The United States' political machin-
ery is characterized by its Presidential form of government whereby the
President, as Chief Executive, is independent of the legislature as to his
tenure and to a large extent as to his policies and acts. The President is
elected for a fixed term of office, and a distinct separation of powers exists
between the Executive and Legislative branches of government.
The Canadian system, on the other hand, is patterned after the British
parliamentary form of government whereby the real executive, consisting of
the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, coordinates and controls both the execu-
tive and hopefully the legislative branches of government. The Canadian sys-
tem, therefore, requires that the Minister and Cabinet members be collec-
tively responsible for government policy and deoend upon continued support
of Parliament for their existence.
The United States budget is formulated, prepared, presented, and
defended by the Executive Branch of government. Unlike the Canadian sys-
tem, legislative reduction, postponement, or other changes do not entail the
life or death of the government. Agencies and departments modify their pro-
grams in accordance with the wishes of Congress and execute the aooropria-
tion acts accordingly. In contrast, a Canadian government would face

78
dissolution and a new election would be held if the Chief Executive was unable
to obtain parliamentary support of his urograms.
Another significant factor to be considered in comparing the United
States and Canadian defence programing systems is one of relative size.
Regardless of what comparison is made between these two countries, the
enormous size of the United States demands much more complex and formal-
ized methods of operation. The Canadian system, on the other hand, requires
less complex and less formal management procedures.
The Present System
The conventional method of programing defence requirements is
accomplished by each individual service. Annually, each service prepares
its own five-year program, which reflects the commitments and requirements
of each. Collectively, these programs are known as the Mark Document, "
which is submitted to the Chiefs of Staff Committee for review. This docu-
ment describes, in general terms, the requirements of each service in terms
of manpower, major equipment, and money for each year of the five-year
period. In effect, it is very similar to the Five Year Force Structure and
Financial Plan instituted by the United States Secretary of Defense. Apart
from being less elaborate and formal, the Mark Document is plagued with
serious defects.
Prior to the integration of the Canadian Armed Forces, operational
planning was the responsibility of service chiefs. The Chairman of the Chiefs
of Staff and the Chiefs of Staff Committee were responsible for coordinating
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the military plans of the services. In this respect it is important to note that
the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff did not possess executive authority and
merely acted as an advisor to the Minister of National Defence and coordinated
the efforts of the Armed Forces toward fulfillment of National Defence objec-
tives. The Royal Commission on Government Organization described the
activities of the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, and his committee's activity as
follows:
The Committee normally meets weekly, and the members collec-
tively consult with the Minister of National Defence at frequent inter-
vals. There is no provision for voting, and no overriding authority is
vested in the Chairman. Recommendations and decisions oi the Com-
mittee must therefore be unanimous; in the event of disagreement, the
Chairman reports the conflicting points of view to the Minister, who
may then exercise his authority at his discretion.
Thus, the effectiveness of the Chiefs of Staff Committee as an
executive authority is, to a large extent, dependent on the personal
qualities of its members, each of whom has a virtual power of veto
in its deliberation.
This situation no longer exists as one of the most significant factors of
integration was the setting up of a single Chief of Defence Staff responsible
for both the control and administration of Canada's Armed Forces. This
action followed very closely the recommendation of the Commission that:
1. Provision be made for the exercise by the Chairman, Chiefs
of Staff, of the ministerial power of direction over the Armed Forces,
within such limits as the Minister may define.
2. The Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, be given the control and
administration" of such elements common to two or more services as
the Minister may designate.
Canada, The Royal Commission on Government Organization , Vol.
IV (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, January 21, 1963), p. 70. (Vol. 4 is Special
Areas of Administration, Sec. 20, Department of National Defence.)
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3. In recognition of the change of status implicit in these propo-
sals, the title of the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, be altered to ''Chief
of Canadian Defence Staffs.
The Minister of National Defence reviewed the recommendations of
the Royal Commission on Government Organization in his White Paper on
Defence" and commented as follows:
Having stated the problem, the Royal Commission recommended
the gradual transfer of executive control of common requirements to
the Chairman, Chiefs of Staff. In the opinion of the government, this
solution does not adequately resolve the basic issues. If a single com-
mand structure is not established, co-ordination by the committee sys-
tem will remain with all of its inevitable delays and frustrations. ^
The Minister then announced the intention of the Government to proceed
beyond the recommendations of the Commission:
Following the most careful and thoughtful consideration, the gov-
ernment has decided that there is only one adequate solution. It is the
integration of the Armed Forces of Canada under a single Chief of
Defence Staff and a single Defence Staff. This will be the first step
toward a single unified defence force for Canada. The integrated con-
trol of all aspects of planning and operations should not only produce a
more effective and co-ordinated defence posture for Canada, but should
also result in considerable savings. 3
Another significant defect of the Mark Document is that it never
receives official sanction and therefore cannot be used as authority for any
action nor as the sole and basic tool for preparing annual estimates. Since













up to date. Postponement, reduction, and cancellations are not incorporated
into the document. A philosophy of trying again next year is frequently prac-
ticed, resulting in an unrealistic backlog of projects awaiting a more favor-
able political climate for resubmission. These plans, therefore, tend to be
substantially beyond the level which is likely to be achieved.
Although the document gives the impression of long-term planning, it
is prepared from scratch each year and tends to represent service hopes
rather than plans which are feasible in terms of resources that are likely to
be available for implementation.
After initial preparation by each of the services, the Mark Docu-
ment " is reviewed by the Chiefs of Staff Committee, followed by a review
involving the Deputy Minister of National Defence and the Treasury Board
staff. The results of these reviews are transmitted to the Minister of National
Defence who, in consultation with the Treasury Board, derives the budget
ceilings for the next fiscal year. A complete study of the Canadian budgetary
process is beyond the scope of this paper. However, it is sufficient to point
out that the review process of defence estimates compared with the United
States procedures is considerably less formal, does not follow as fixed a
pattern, and is not as well documented.
Under the present system, defence plans and programs receive offi-
cial sanction and become the basis for action only in so far as they are
reflected in the approved annual estimates.
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A Proposed Programing System
The expanding size, cost, and complexity of Canadian defence
requirements demand improved planning and financial management tools.
Managei-nent philosophy and procedures which were suitable to meet yester-
day's needs cannot adequately cope with today's defence problems and those
of the future.
Immediately after World War II, defence expenditures began to fall
and appeared to be returning to traditional peacetime expenditure levels.
However, the crisis in Korea supplemented by Canada's expanding role and
commitments on the international scer.e resulted in a defence effort of
increasing magnitude, reversing this downward post-war trend. Defence
expenditures which had been reduced to $385 million in 1950 responded
quickly to increased defence activity and rose to $1, 652 million by 1962.
This fact is also evidenced in the increase in manpower over the same
period, rising from 47. 2 thousand in 1950 to 126. 5 thousand in 1962. These
statistics may not seem significant when compared to a United States defense
budget of approximately $50 billion. However, relatively speaking, the im-
pact of this increase is equal in magnitude to that experienced in the United
States.
The $1, 652 million spent in 1961-62 by the Department of National
Defence (including the Defence Research Board) and for defence pur-
chasing and civil defence represented 25 per cent of total federal ex-
penditures, but defence activities in terms of employment, equipment




and other operating costs accounted for an even larger proportion of
federal government operations. Excluding statutory grants, payments
to provinces and debt service, the remaining expenditures of the Gov-
ernment of Canada on its own operations in 1961 -2 were less than
$4,000 million, of which more than 40 per cent is accounted for by
defence spending.
In order to meet the challenge of Canada's growing and complex defence
effort, the Deputy Minister of National Defence formed the Defence Program
Working Group ' to establish a Defence programing system suitable for meet-
ing the current and future needs of the Department of National Defence.
The working group commenced the study in November, 1963, and made
considerable progress toward designing a programing system for the Canadian
Armed Forces. A study was made of the programing system implemented by
United States Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara and Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense (Comptroller) Charles J. Hitch.
The proposed Canadian programing system was cast in the same
moid and outside of deviations necessitated by a different political and or-
ganizational environment, it is similar to that implemented in the United
States.
At present, the Canadian system does not entail a comprehensive,
long-term defence program approved by the Minister of National Defence and
developed in such a manner as to provide a useful tool for coordinating the
planning and budgetary process. Also significant is the fact that at present





of national security policies at a level above the Department of National
Defence.
The programing system proposed will provide a systematic statement
of military activities, organized into programs and supported by adequate
details displaying the planned allocation of funds, manpower, and facilities
over a stated period of time. These data will provide the framework within
which central and effective decisions can be made concerning financial plans,
force structure, allocation of priorities, choice of weapons systems, man-
power levels, and other similar matters.
The main objective of the proposed Canadian system is not to provide
automatic decision making but to improve the data available to decision
makers in order that they may perform their functions with greater rational-
ity. Decisions will be based on significant data which are better organized
and more systematically prepared than those used at present.
The essential purpose of the programing system is to provide a useful
management aid at the apex of military decision makers. The Minister of
National Defence, the Chief of Defence Staff, the Deputy Minister, as well as
the individual services, will find the system particularly valuable in assess-
ing new proposals which can conveniently be assessed in relation to one
another and to the over -all defence program. Policy makers, planners, and
programers will be provided with a common frame of reference within which
programs or amendments thereto can be evaluated within the context of the




Unlike the Mark Document, the system will provide a useful means
of bridging the gap between planning and budgeting. Once implemented, the
approved long-term, program will form the only authorized basis for the
preparation of estimates. Preparation of estimates will become a matter of
translating the cost of program elements for the next fiscal year into budget-
ary appropriation format.
In addition to the advantages above noted, the system will also provide
a tangible means of reflecting and evaluating the long-term effects of budget-
ary reductions or other decisions imposed from above. The implications of
such decisions can be readily determined, assessed, and followed through
adequately.
The essential feature of this system is that the total defence effort
will be expressed in terms of missions to be accomplished. The data accumu-
lated will reflect the details of an approved long-term program. It is antici-
pated that the program will be approved by the Minister of National Defence
in substance and approved by the Government in principle. The above
approvals would represent a definite advantage over the United States pro-
graming system in that legislative approval would almost certainly follow.
In structuring the Canadian Defence programing system, the Working
Group proposed setting the total Canadian Defence objectives in terms of
seven major programs. These programs will carry the explicit approval of
the Minister of National Defence and serve as approved directives to the
Department of National Defence.
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Each program will be analyzed into principal components and sub-
components, such as operational force requirements, logistic and supoort
forces, mission training, and command and control.
Each component and sub -component in turn will be analyzed into its
elements. As in the United States system, elements are defined as the low-
est level for which programs system documentation will be maintained. The
elements themselves consist of units or groups of units. Program elements
are the basic building blocks of the system. It is the elements that will be
priced out and for which data will be maintained. Each of these elements is
analyzed in terms of forces, equipment, financial estimates, manpower,
major equipment, and other resource data.
Collectively the seven major programs will represent the over all
approved military plans expressed in terms of missions to be accomplished
in order to achieve national and internal defence objectives. The documenta-
tions will describe in detail inputs of forces, equipment, manpower, and
expenditures required to support the programs over a five-year period.
It is proposed that documentation of program elements will be main-
tained in the Deputy Minister of National Defence's office and kept up to date.
Service activities will be carried out within the framework of approved
programs.
Any effective system must be adaptable to the environment in which it
is expected to func tion. In a large-scale and complex organization such as
the Department of National Defence, it is evident that planning, orograming,
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and budgeting are dynamic management functions. In order to remain viable,
such a system must be flexible and orovide for possible changes resulting
from decisions on policy affecting defence, availability of funds, phasing of
procurement programs, manpower levels, and so on. Under the present
system, such decisions tend to be made in relation to the current year's
estimates. Decisions which affect defence policy, funds, and other resources
must be expressed and recorded in terms of their long-term as well as their
short-term effects on military activities.
The defence programing system is intended to provide a means of
reflecting the long-term effects of decisions, such as budgetary cuts, post-
ponement of procurement, imposition of manpower ceilings, or other similar
questions in terms of specific program elements over a specified time period.
The objective is that the effects of today's decisions on future activities will
be clearly identified and written into the detail of the long-term program.
Only by this means can programs be kept on a realistic basis.
Changes to approved programs can also be initiated from the lower
echelons of military organization. If a change became necessary during the
year, the service concerned would propose it in accordance with an estab-
lished program change system. Depending upon the magnitude and signifi-
cance of the proposed change, necessary approval would be sought in order
to include it in the approved program. To prevent all change proposals
reaching the very apex of defence management, a system of thresholds




In addition to a program change procedure, an annual review of the
programs will be carried out for the purpose of up-dating the programs to
reflect approved changes as well as implementing policy changes resulting
from current and anticipated national and international conditions.
Although the programing system described above is feasible and highly
desirable, one should not underestimate the difficulties often encountered in
implementing concepts in an actual environment.
A Program Budget
Although a program budget is a useful by-product of a programing
system, the proposed Canadian defence system will be compatible with the
present Canadian Federal budgetary system. The system will function, as
it does in the United States, without a program budget.
It is highly possible, however, that changes in the Canadian budgetary
process may be adopted in the near future. The Royal Commission on Gov-
ernment Organization has recommended drastic and far-reaching changes in
Canadian Government financial management. A project group under the
direction of James C. Thompson, Resident Partner, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell
and Company (Canada), Ottawa, Ontario, was designated by the Commission
to reoort on steps that may be taken for the purpose of 'making more effec-
tive use of budgeting, accounting and other financial measures as means of





The group viewed the role of budgeting, accounting, and other finan-
cial measures as:
A means of providing all levels of management with targets or
objectives so that performance of each may be measured. They also
provide a check on the efficiency with which available resources,
material and human, are used . . . the explosive growth in the scale
of government expenditure necessitates the adoption of modern and
efficient management methods, similar in many respects to those
employed by business.
The study group concluded that the present methods of financial man-
agement were inadequate to cope with a large-scale, complex, and diverse
government activity. The present cash budget in terms of standard objects
of expenditures is inadequate for efficient financial management. Although
object classification has attractions from a statistical point of view, it has
limited value as a means of planning and control. This type of classification
also has an adverse effect on the review of estimates by the Treasury Board.
The increasing magnitude of government expenditures has resulted in closer
scrutiny of estimates; however, the reviews tend to focus on the details of
proposed expenditures rather than with the competing needs giving rise to
them.
The Commission therefore recommended a program- budget for all
government activities. Some of the pertinent recommendations made by the
Canada, The Royal Commission on Government Organization , Vol. I
{Ottawa: Queen's Printer, July 18, 1962), p. 94. (Vol. I is Management of






Commission are listed below:
1. All departments and agencies be required to prepare and sub-
mit to the Executive long-term plans of expenditures requirements by
programmes.
2. Based thereon, an overall forecast of government expenditures
and projected resources for a period of five years be prepared annually.
3. The number of votes be reduced and all cost elements of indi-
vidual programmes be consolidated within the same vote.
4. Departmental estimates be prepared on the basis of programmes
of activity and not by standard objects of expenditure.
5. More objective standards for analysis and comparison be
developed and employed by serior departmental management and the
Treasury Board in the review process. ^
6. The form of the Estimates be revised so that the vote will
more clearly describe the purposes of expenditures, more comparable
and complete supporting information could be provided, and unnecessary
detail eliminated. ^
The above-noted recommendations point to a 'program budget.
Although it is beyond the scope of this study to predict the adoption of program
budgeting in the Federal government, the integration of the Armed Forces
under a single Chief, Defence Staff, and the proposed programing system
were largely influenced by the recommendations of the Commission. If this
eventually becomes a reality, the gap between planning and budgeting will
have been bridged, providing a useful and powerful tool for effective manage-












Budgeting is primarily concerned with the control and effective alloca-
tion of limited resources toward the achievement of an almost inexhaustible
range of objectives.
During the affluent developmental stage of the United States, an
abundance of resources led to budgetary policies concerned primarily with
the control of the purse rather than with the effective use of resources.
As the rising costs of expanding and complex government activities
began to exert pressure on financial management policies, budgetary reforms
focused attention on the more effective use of resources. After World War II
reforms to improve the content and presentation of the Federal budget began
to gather momentum. It was during this period that military financial man-
agement procedures underwent considerable reform. The National Security
Act of 1947, Title IV of the National Security Act Amendments of 1949, the
Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950, and the Defense Reorganiza-
tion Act of 1958 were among the significant legislative landmarks affecting
the military.
Implementation of a performance-type budget as recommended by the
first Hoover Commission took considerable time to take a firm hold in the




objective was, but its accomplishment proved to be a difficult and laborious
task. The first attempts at implementing this recommendation were primarily
in the form of appropriation title modifications and reclassification. Although
these reforms led to the assumption that a performance -type budget had been
established, implementation of a more effective performance budget was not
realized until after the appointment in 1961 of Robert S. McNamara as Secre-
tary of Defense and Charles J. Hitch as the Assistant Secretary (Comptroller).
Prior to this time, military planning and financial management had
been treated as indeoendent activities. Planning fell within the domain of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff and was projected well into the future. Budgeting, on
the other hand, was performed by the comptrollers whose time horizon was
projected on a year -by-year basis. To bridge this gap between planning and
budgeting, a orograming system was established.
The primary purpose of the system was to integrate these three inter-
related but all important phases of the decision-making process. The core
of the system was established in the Five Year Force Structure and Financial
Plan, which became basically a summary of all approved programs for the
Department of Defense and represented the authority for all military activities.
In order to maintain this core in harmony with the changing times,
a Program Change Control system was established to provide a controlled,
rapid, and effective review and approval of proposed additions, deletions,
or modifications.
Together with the related activities of progress reporting, control,
evaluation, and cost /effectiveness studies, the new system has resulted in
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a significant improvement in the decision -making process.
One significant effect of the system has been a greater concentration
of power in the Secretary of Defense, resulting in centralized responsibility
for planning and determination of policy, combined with the decentralization
of responsibility for execution.
Among the weaknesses of the system has been the arbitrary nature by
which some of the elements are classified under programs. In an organiza-
tion as large and as complex as the United States Department of Defense, it
is difficult to devise a simple and neat classification for the entire defense
effort into nine primary programs. The statement that program decisions
would be budget decisions has sometimes been criticized, and confidence in
the system has been weakened when budget decisions at times become program
decisions. It is important to note in this respect that the programing system
as implemented by Secretary McNamara has been an internal one operating
within the confines of the Defense Department. Until Congress accepts the
program budget concept, the bridge will continue to bear two-way traffic.
The proposed Canadian programing system is cast from the same mold
as that used in the United States and other than deviations necessitated by the
the differences in political and organizational environment, it is similar to
the one being used in the Pentagon. It is anticipated that under a parliamen-
tary system, defence programs will receive approval in principle by the
government. This would represent a significant advantage and could possibly
lead to a program budget. Recommendations of the Royal Commission on
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Government Organization point toward this possibility.
Management philosophy and procedures which met yesterday's needs
cannot adequately cope with the defense problems of today and the future.
The programing system implemented by Secretary of Defense McNamara and




GLOSSARY OF BASIC TERMS*
This glossary is intended to introduce the reader of this thesis to the
basic terminology commonly used in the United States integrated system of





Impartial analysis of information, at each
responsible management and control level,
from which the effectiveness and efficiency of
the total process can be measured (operators
self -appraisal, independent appraisal, over-
all program appraisal).
The individual designated as responsible for
justifying the need for the procurement of
funds for an appropriation within its budget
process.
The individual program elements or other
components of the Five Year Force Structure
and Financial Plan approved by the Secretary
of Defense and as modified by the Secretary of
Defense by approved Program Change Proposals.
A planned program for a fiscal period in terms
of (a) estimated costs, obligations, and expendi-
tures, (b) source of funds for financing, includ-
ing reimbursements anticipated, and other re-
sources to be applied, and (c) explanatory and
workload data on the projected programs and
activities.
* - Source: Adapted from Department of the Navy, Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations, The Navy Programming Manual: Part I, Pro-













The ability to execute a special course of action.
A listing of major military construction projects
which provides by fiscal year the cost and loca-
tion for each approved construction line item
which exceeds $1 million.
A method for examining alternative means of
accomplishing desired military missions for
the purpose of selecting weapons and forces
which will provide the greatest military effec-
tiveness for the cost.
The operation of carrying out a program as
contained in the approved budget (program
execution).
The summation of the approved programs of
the Department of Defense components (see
Approved Programs).
The network of all communication methods
within an organization. It includes information
exchanged upward, downward, or laterally to
accomplish the objectives of the organization
as well as information fed back to be used in
management appraisal, progressing, control-
ling, scheduling, planning, and also in replan-
ning, rescheduling, and other phases, to assure
the appropriate emi result.
Those program coats required beyond the devel-
opment phase to introduce into operational use a
new capability, to procure initial, additional
or replacement requipment for operational
forces or to provide for major modifications of
an existing capability. They include procure-
ment appropriation costs, except those asso-
ciated with the operating catego^ y f and all
military construction appropriation costs except
those associated with research and development.
They exclude RDT & E, Military Personnel, and
Operation and Maintenance appropriation costs.
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Material Annex A listing of on-hand or procurement line items,
selected by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense because of their si?5e or imnortance,
with descriptive information, cost data, pro-





A portion of a program element or aggregation
separately displayed for information purooses.
The assigned functions, task, roles, and pur-
poses of an organization. The objective; the
task together with the purpose, which clearly




A goal, expressed as that portion of the what, "
when, !l and where of a requirement which is
reasonably feasible of attainment within the
expected availability of the resources of men,
money, and technological capability (force
objective, program objective).
Those program costs necessary to operate and
maintain the capability. These costs include
Military Personnel, Operation and Maintenance
and recurring Procurement appropriation costs
('Such as replenishment snares). They exclude




The required actions or capabilities needed to
accomplish a mission (operational plan, logis-
tics plan, general plan).
(I) A plan or scheme of action designed for the
accomplishment of a definite objective which is
specific as to the time -phasing of the work to
be done and the means proposed for its accom-
plishment, particularly in quantitative terms,
with respect to manpower, materiel, and facili
ties requirements. Thus, a program provides
a basis for budgeting; (2) a segment or element











A combination of program elements designed for
the accomplishment of a definite objective or
plan which is specific as to the time ohasintz of
what is to be done and the means proposed for
its accomplishment. The major comoonents of
the DOD Programing Systen- are the numbered
programs in the FYFS & FP.
Detailed listings or specific resource require-
ments of the five-year programs.
Proposals for changes to the Approved Program
or component thereof.
The estimate of Total Obligationai Authority
required.
Consists of Research and Development, Invest-
ment, and Operating Costs.
An integrated activity; an identifiable military
capability; a force, support activity, etc.
,






The individual who has the responsibility for
coordinating the development of proposed pro-
gram changes to the program elements in the
DOD Programing System.
The individual designated as responsible for
determining program objectives, time -phasing,
and support requirements, and for appraising
progress, readiness and military worth of
programs.
The process of establishing and maintaining a
program.
A planned undertaking of something to be accom
plished, produced, or constructed, having a
finite beginning and a finite ending. For exam-












The individual designated by a program sponsor
from within his organization who assists the
program sponsor in formulation and administra-
tion of a program, monitors the execution of
a project for the program sponsor, and trans-
mits guidance from the program sponsor to the
producer organization as required.
Any transmission (presentation) of data or infor-
mation, on a one-time, recurring, regular,
periodic, or as required basis, whether in oral
or written narrative, tabular, graphic, ques-
tionnaire, punched-card, tape, or other form,
regardless of method of preparation or trans-
mission.
The flow of information, including the proce-
dures and methods for preparing, transmitting,
and using, which serves an integrated informa-
tion system, a management information system,
or a portion of a system or other operation.
(1) The need or demand for personnel, equ:
ment, facilities, other resources, or services,
by specific quantitatives for specific periods of
time or at a specified time. (2) For use in
budgeting, item requirements should be screened
as to individual priority and approved in the light
of total available budget resources. (The what,"
the when, " and the where" considered neces-
sary to carry out a plan in order to accomplish
a mission, such as force requirement, materiel
requirement.
)
An assembly of procedures, processes, methods,
routines, or techniques united by some form of
regulated interaction to form an organized whole.
A set of criteria which, if met or exceeded, re-
quires the submission of a program change pro-
posal to the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
The total financial requirements for the Five
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